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Abstract Recent disclosures suggest that many govern-
ments apply indiscriminate mass surveillance technologies
that allow them to capture and store a massive amount of
communications data belonging to citizens and non-citi-
zens alike. This article argues that traditional liberal cri-
tiques of government surveillance that center on an
individual right to privacy cannot completely capture the
harm that is caused by such surveillance because they
ignore its distinctive political dimension. As a complement
to standard liberal approaches to privacy, the article
develops a critique of surveillance that focuses on the
question of political power in the public sphere.
Keywords Surveillance  Privacy  Public sphere 
Political power
Introduction
The liberal debate about a ‘‘right to privacy’’ traditionally
took a certain technological background for granted. It
always envisaged violations of privacy in relation to
specific information about specific individuals. As a result,
liberal authors often understood the right to privacy as an
individual right that protects individual interests (Parent
1983; Prosser 1960; Regan 1995, p. xiii; Thomson 1975;
Warren and Brandeis 1890).
It is apparent that this is problematic if one considers
only one of the government programs unveiled by NSA
whistle-blower Edward Snowden. As part of its TEM-
PORA program, the British GCHQ accesses fiber-optic
cables that carry a massive amount of Internet traffic.
GCHQ stores all data that passes through these cables for
several days (GCHQ Authors 2014; MacAskill et al. 2013).
Following analysis, subsets are selected for longer (po-
tentially indefinite) storage. Such a program is only pos-
sible thanks to technological advances, among them price
decreases for storage media and faster processors in com-
munications equipment. The usefulness of such a program
is also tied to advances in ‘‘big data’’ analytics, that is,
search algorithms that make it possible to perform rela-
tively quick analyses of large amounts of data (Lyon 2014).
These indiscriminate mass surveillance technologies
raise several issues that are absent from classic discussions
of privacy. First, they have unprecedented scale: programs
like TEMPORA affect almost every member of the elec-
torate in the concerned countries, rather than only specific
individuals. While traditional discussions of privacy focus
on individuals, it does not seem unreasonable to think that
differences in scale also make a moral difference. It might
be morally unproblematic to collect some information
about a few people, but problematic to gather it for
everyone all the time. A second problem concerns the
separation between two senses of surveillance, surveillance
in the sense of information capture and storage and in the
sense of access to information (Solove 2006, p. 490).
Indiscriminate surveillance technologies allow intelligence
services to acquire large amounts of information first and
filter out irrelevant information later. This raises the issue
of whether there is something already wrong with mere
information capture even when the government is legally
constrained from using the information in illegitimate
ways. Finally, programs like TEMPORA lead to a situation
where the government regularly intercepts political
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communications between citizens. While traditional
accounts of privacy typically do not focus on behavior that
is intended to be public by definition (such as political
speech or demonstrations), many commentators believe
that political surveillance is particularly problematic
(Greenwald and Hussain 2014; Wolf 2012). This special
status of public, political communications is not widely
acknowledged by standard liberal theories of privacy.1
Theories of privacy in the liberal tradition usually depart
from one of two normative intuitions: liberal individualist
and neo-republican accounts take surveillance to be a
violation of individual liberty. Relational accounts take
surveillance to be a violation of the individual’s autonomy
over his or her social relationships. This article argues that
both accounts do not allow us to fully appreciate the nor-
mative issues raised by ubiquitous surveillance. First, they
have difficulty making sense of the intuition that surveil-
lance is wrong even when the information captured is not
used illegitimately. Second, most liberal accounts under-
stand the harm caused by surveillance as a threat to the
individual liberty to retreat from the public sphere
(Emerson 1970, p. 549). This ‘‘privative conception of
privacy’’ has little room for reflection on how surveillance
also harms collective goods. Even those authors who
acknowledge the necessity of privacy for political freedom
merely see privacy from public scrutiny as a precondition
for political freedom, rather than privacy as an integral part
of the political domain (Arendt 1958, p. 70; Cohen 2000,
p. 1425; Hughes 2015; Nissenbaum 2004, p. 132; Roberts
2014; Solove 2006, p. 551). Third, the liberal view seems
to counter-intuitively entail that surveillance of public (e.g.
political) behavior is not particularly problematic as long as
the information gathered is not used to interfere with
individual liberty (Nissenbaum 2004, p. 116).
Liberal privacy theory therefore needs to be supple-
mented with an analysis of surveillance as the exercise of a
distinctive kind of government power over the public.
Mass surveillance and individual liberty
Liberal accounts of privacy traditionally focus on the
contribution of (informational) privacy to individual free-
dom (Roessler 2004; Solove 2006). In this context, ‘‘pri-
vacy’’ refers to the individual’s right to exclude others
(such as the government) from access to certain kinds of
information. It thus delineates a protected sphere of liberty
that liberal theorists take as central to the individual’s
ability to live an autonomous life. There are two possible
arguments for such a ‘‘protective’’ account, referring either
to the value of ‘‘negative liberty’’ or to the neo-republican
value of ‘‘non-domination’’.
The first argument states that there is a necessary con-
nection between privacy and individual ‘‘negative’’ liberty.
We often need to keep information secret from other
people to keep them from interfering with our choices (de
Bruin 2010, p. 513f), to retain control over our self-pre-
sentation (Marmor 2015, p. 10) or to retain control over the
access we grant others to our lives (Roessler 2004).
Privacy rights can indeed help to protect our negative
liberty by keeping information out of the hands of others
who would otherwise use it to interfere with our choices or
our self-presentation or who would use it to gain access
into previously hidden aspects of our lives. However, this
argument not only fails to establish protections for political
communication between citizens in public. When the issue
at question is the indiscriminate gathering of information
by an appropriately constrained liberal regime, this argu-
ment also does not show that there is anything intrinsically
wrong about such surveillance in general. If there are legal
provisions that bar the government from accessing data for
purposes of interfering illegitimately with people’s choices,
no degree of surveillance will decrease their negative lib-
erty in the sense of non-interference. One might argue that
surveillance constitutes an infringement of negative liberty
in the sense of control over access, as by definition
surveillance implies that those affected have no choice
about whether they want the government to have access to
the relevant information. However, in the case of an
appropriately constrained government, no additional choi-
ces seem to be affected, such that the impact on their lib-
erty seems to remain marginal.
Of course, these arguments presuppose that the gov-
ernment indeed resists the temptation to interfere illegiti-
mately, a premise that is doubted by many (Stallman 2013).
However, we not only make this assumption in other
regards for democratic governments. This argument also
makes it obvious that the main worry on this account is not
surveillance, but interference. If indiscriminate mass
surveillance does not lead to an increase in government
interference, a negative liberty account must remain neutral
towards such developments.
A second argument is presented by neo-republican
authors. According to these authors, what privacy protects
us from is not interference but domination. Someone is
dominated whenever there is someone else who has the
option of arbitrarily interfering with their choices, whether
this option is taken or not (Lovett 2010; Pettit 1997).
Therefore, it does not matter that the information that is
gathered by indiscriminate mass surveillance is, in fact, not
abused (Skinner 2015). The mere fact that surveillance puts
1 Surprisingly, the US legal framework incorporates stronger con-
straints in the case of political surveillance (due to the First




the government in a position to use it to interfere with its
citizens’ choices constitutes domination (Roberts 2014).
Such an account seems to be better suited for a critique of
indiscriminate mass surveillance because it entails that the
fact that surveillance creates or increases the power of the
state to interfere constitutes domination.
This neo-republican argument can explain why infor-
mation gathering (enabling the potential use of informa-
tion) is possibly harmful. However, surveillance as such is
certainly never sufficient to ensure that some agent is in a
position to interfere with my choices. Even when an agent
succeeds, through surveillance, in acquiring all the infor-
mation necessary to interfere with me, there are almost
always other means available to third parties to block such
an agent from actually interfering. In the case of the gov-
ernment, the most obvious choice for providing such means
is a strong constitutional rights regime.
It follows that indiscriminate mass surveillance is not
intrinsically wrong, but it can contribute to domination
when there are no other rules or constraints that block
arbitrary interference. However, if such further restraints
are missing, it is the fact that they are absent that leads to
domination, not the mere possibility of surveillance in
isolation. Just like the negative liberty argument, the neo-
republican argument does not account for the widespread
intuition that there is something intrinsically wrong with
indiscriminate mass surveillance (Hoye and Monaghan
2015).
Relational accounts
Liberal individualist and neo-republican accounts under-
stand privacy only as valuable insofar as it protects indi-
vidual liberty. Therefore, the social and political effects of
surveillance often escape their notice. This individualist
bias has often been criticized by communitarian and fem-
inist theorists (Etzioni 2000; MacKinnon 1987, p. 96).
Within the liberal tradition, as well, many authors have
recognized that a purely individualist defense of a right to
privacy is problematic (Regan 1995, p. xiv). In response to
these worries, it is sometimes argued that privacy not
protects individual freedom of action but that it also safe-
guards certain forms of social interaction (Fried 1968;
Rachels 1975; Schoeman 1984; Solove 2007) Therefore,
many authors hold that privacy is both valuable for the
individual and for society (Hughes 2015). While the social
value of privacy is often only acknowledged in terms of
privacy enabling intimate relationships (Inness 1992),
some authors have recently also emphasized its value for
non-intimate relationships (Roessler and Mokrosinska
2013, p. 772). Intimate as well as professional relationships
are governed by conventional norms that either mandate or
prohibit sharing certain information. For example, many
kinds of intimate relationships are governed by a norm
mandating that one must exclusively share certain kinds of
personal information. Relationships between lecturers and
students, in contrast, are governed by a norm mandating
that lecturers must not share certain details about their
private life with students (Roessler and Mokrosinska 2013,
p. 781). In both cases, it is control over information sharing
that enables people to engage in different roles (Roessler
2004, p. 131; Westin 1970, p. 7). Something similar is even
true for relationships between strangers in public: the ‘‘civil
inattention’’ that members of the public expect from each
other enables them to interact with each other as citizens
(Nagel 1998; Nissenbaum 1997; Roessler and Mokrosinska
2013, p. 782; Solove 2007, p. 762).
While these arguments acknowledge the social value of
privacy and show that privacy rights can also protect public
activities, it is not entirely clear what they entail for the
issue of indiscriminate mass surveillance. First, most inti-
mate and professional relationships are not, in fact,
undermined by mass surveillance. People have successful,
intimate long-distance relationships, communicating over
channels that they know are subject to government moni-
toring. Second, these theories spell out the non-intimate
value of privacy in public by reference to the practice of
‘‘civil inattention’’ between citizens. However, as long as
governments only collect and store communications and do
not disclose them to third parties, this does not seem to
undermine this practice. Third, the value of privacy in these
respects still mainly refers to control over information that
people are assumed to want to keep secret from others
(such as intimate details about their life). If the information
that is collected concerns citizens’ political activities, this
seems not to undermine privacy in this role-functional
sense.
Political power
In order to develop an alternative account that avoids these
problems, I will now argue that indiscriminate mass
surveillance amounts to a distinctive form of the exercise
of political power over the public sphere. In the final sec-
tion of the paper, I will attempt to show—based on Ju¨rgen
Habermas’s theory of the public sphere—that surveillance
violates a basic interest of a democratic public to exercise
control over its collective practices. With this argument, I
want to provide a more substantial foundation for the idea
that privacy is a political value (Goold 2009, 2010; Regan
1995, p. 225ff; Simitis 1987).
For the purpose of this argument, it is worth taking a
brief look at the concept of power more generally: power is
usually taken as the ability of an agent to control the
Indiscriminate mass surveillance and the public sphere 35
123
behavior of another agent (Dahl 2002; Wartenberg 1991;
Weber 1978). Most familiar cases of power concern the
ability of agents either to physically control the behavior of
other agents or to provide them with reasons to perform
certain actions, for example, by issuing threats or offering
incentives. Consequently, we typically think of political
power as the government’s power to coercively enforce
rules that set up a structure of sanctions and incentives
(Luhmann 1979).
However, if we understand power as the ability to
influence the behavior of others by means of influencing
their reasons, we can see that political power can also have
other modalities. Many of the reasons that govern people’s
actions are not independent of social institutions. For
example, if one performs an action out of professional
obligation, patriotic duty or romantic commitment, the
reasons involved in these acts presuppose certain social
institutions and shared understandings. The reasons that
govern social interactions, in particular, are very often
dependent on the participants standing in specific social
relationships with each other and having certain social
roles (Hayward 2000; Isaac 1987; Wartenberg 1991). One
can therefore exercise power over people not only by
directly giving them reasons to act (such as by providing an
incentive) but also indirectly by influencing the social
‘‘space of reasons’’ that is available to them (Forst 2015,
p. 14), for example, by making certain kinds of relation-
ships difficult to obtain, de facto unavoidable or obligatory.
The political power of governments typically includes this
capacity. Through legislation and executive actions, gov-
ernments can change the social context of citizens’ inter-
actions, creating or changing non-government institutions
in ways that change the space of reasoning that is available
for their members.
New technologies of indiscriminate mass surveillance
have made new forms of such ‘‘indirect’’, reasons-based
power available to governments. These technologies allow
them to shape the communicative environment of citizen-
to-citizen communications, such that certain kinds of
relationships become impossible and others become
unavailable. Such technologies shape the public sphere in a
way that is likely to have an effect on those reasons that are
dependent on the citizens standing in certain kinds of
relationships in the public sphere.
For example, imagine an activist group that deliberates
about how best to address the public. Such a group might
not need to keep any information secret from the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, it might be essential for the social
relationships sustaining the concrete processes of deliber-
ation within this group that no one else is involved in some
discussions—not even the government in a listening
capacity (Fisher 2004, p. 646; Starr et al. 2008; Tilly 2005).
Similarly, the practice of ‘‘consciousness raising’’ is a
central element of feminist activism (MacKinnon 1989,
Chap. 5). It is fundamental to this practice that it is a matter
of women talking to each other, without men being
involved. The reason for this is not that the women
engaging in this practice want to keep information secret,
but because the absence of men allows them to engage in
certain relationships with each other that, again, sustain a
distinctive form of political deliberation. We can only
make sense of such practices when we acknowledge that
the collective ability of a group to control who participates
in a given social context amounts to control over the form
of relationships that become possible in that context and
that such control sustains practices and forms of reasoning
that are essential for political agency in the public sphere.
It is important to note that we can only understand why
the mere surveillance of groups can constitute a form of
power when we recognize the link between control over
membership in groups, the structure of social relationships
between members, and the reasons that emerge from such
relationships. If communications in the public sphere are
subject to surveillance, most members of the public lose
the ability to control their social relationships to other
members leading to a change of the character of the rela-
tionships constitutive of the public sphere. As a conse-
quence, if a government engages in indiscriminate
surveillance, then it exercises political power by shaping
the space of agency that social roles make available to
citizens and thereby the reasons that can potentially lead
them to action.
Surveillance and the value of the public sphere
Having argued that surveillance is a form of relationship-
shaping political power, I will now turn to the issue of the
legitimacy of such power: should the state exercise such
power and what should be its limits?
Initially, it might seem as if we could easily solve this
question with another variation of the liberal account,
arguing that surveillance violates the citizens’ right to
determine who has access to the groups that are important
to them. However, it is quite obvious that, if there is such a
right, it cannot be an individual right—individuals typi-
cally do not have the right to determine who can be a
member of the various groups they move in. What mass
surveillance constrains is therefore not individual liberty
but collective self-determination.
Furthermore, even if one admits that indiscriminate
mass surveillance amounts to an exercise of political power
over some part of the public sphere, why should this be
considered problematic? Certainly, not all potential forms
of collective self-determination are intrinsically valuable,
and not all relationships and all reasons they give rise to are
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equally worthy of protection. In other words, the argument
as it has been developed so far does not tell us anything
about the proper limits of government surveillance.
In order to answer these questions, one has to look more
closely at the specific value of a political public sphere. In
the liberal tradition, authors like John Stuart Mill (1989)
have emphasized the value of the public sphere for indi-
vidual freedom, referring to the epistemic benefits of public
discussion in terms of an increased chance to arrive at the
truth and in terms of the intrinsic value of having a public
sphere in which people can realize their individuality by
taking up positions towards important issues (Cohen 2000,
p. 1426; Regan 1995, p. 222). These arguments lead Mill to
a principle that recommends that the government should
only minimally interfere in the public sphere because all
interventions by non-discursive means tend to undermine
these benefits (although there are also always reasons that
can justify such intrusions). This argument can easily be
extended from censorship to surveillance as soon as it is
acknowledged that surveillance is also a form of the gov-
ernment intervening in the public sphere.
Such an argument is still relatively weak, however, as it
does not establish a special status for political communi-
cations. More importantly, it is open to the objection, once
more, that the mere gathering and storage of information
does not typically lead to any harm in these regards.
A stronger foundation for a critique of indiscriminate
mass surveillance of public political activities can be found
in Habermas’s theory of the public sphere (Habermas 1991,
1996). Habermas describes the public sphere as a collection
of practices that regulate themselves on the basis of norms
that aim at generating consensus through argumentative
agreement rather than through strategic threats and sanc-
tions. Communicative interaction in the public sphere is
thus distinct from action coordination in the sphere of the
state where bureaucratic power is the regulating medium
(and from the market, where that function is performed by
money). By arguing that such interaction enables the
development of ‘‘communicative rationality’’, Habermas
not only emphasizes that the public sphere incorporates a
specific form of social interaction, but also that this type of
interaction underpins a specific form of rationality—not the
means-ends rationality of government and the market, but a
specific discursive form of rationality through which
arguments, goals, and values themselves can be examined.
The public sphere can only display this specific form of
rationality under certain conditions, however: people must
not only be capable of communicating without outside
intervention distorting the internal logic of discourse
(Parsons 2015, p. 8), they must also be capable of deter-
mining the structure and the rules of their communicative
interactions themselves using communicative reason (Co-
hen and Arato 1997; Habermas 1996, p. 370). What counts
as a good argument and which forms of discourse are
sufficient to settle specific matters must be something that
is up to the participants themselves in such communicative
interactions.
If we combine Habermas’s account of the public sphere
with his idea that a well-functioning political public sphere
is the only source of democratic legitimation, this provides
us not only with an argument for why the political public
sphere specifically deserves protection from state inter-
vention. Connecting his account with the idea that
surveillance shapes relationships and thereby reasons
inevitably leads to the conclusion that surveillance of the
public sphere undermines the specific form of rationality
that this sphere displays in the ideal case. This is because
surveillance makes it impossible for participants to control
the relationships that are constitutive of specific forms of
discourses. Therefore, surveillance must count as an
intervention into the process of collective reasoning dis-
tinctive to this sphere.
Feminist critics of Habermas, such as Fraser (1990),
have extended his conception arguing that subordinated
groups often need public spheres of their own to effectively
participate in politics. They consequently argue that polit-
ical legitimacy must be based on the interaction of multiple
publics, each of them controlled by members of the rele-
vant groups. Following these arguments, it seems reason-
able to conclude that autonomous collective control over
the relationships constituting not only one but multiple
public spheres is a precondition for the participation of
both the majority and minorities in democratic self-
government.
This argument leads to a new account of the harm cre-
ated by surveillance: indiscriminate surveillance of politi-
cal, public activities removes the option for participants of
the public sphere to collectively determine what social
relations are appropriate for this sphere and it thereby
limits their ability to exercise collective communicative
freedom (Habermas 1996, p. 369; Warner 2002). The
interest that is violated by surveillance is, consequently, not
only an individual interest in liberty but also a collective
interest in self-determination that can only be effectively
safeguarded by exempting political public spheres from
surveillance (Parsons 2015).
These considerations suggest that indiscriminate mass
surveillance not only threatens individual liberty and non-
domination and undermines valuable non-political rela-
tionships, but that it also constitutes a form of exercise of
political power over the public sphere that is incompatible
with the idea of democratic self-determination.
In contrast to liberal theories, this account does not base
its critique of surveillance on the value of the private
sphere for individual liberty, but it also acknowledges a
distinct political value of surveillance-free public
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interaction. Furthermore, it can show why not only the use
but also the mere gathering of information can be prob-
lematic. This is because the gathering of information
changes the environment of social relationships and
thereby undermines collective self-determination.
Regarding policy considerations, this argument suggests
much stronger constraints on indiscriminate mass surveil-
lance than the liberal accounts: first, the employment of
technologies of indiscriminate data capture and storage that
encompass the public sphere by design, such as the British
TEMPORA program, is in principle illegitimate. Second,
whenever more targeted surveillance technologies of any
kind are employed, there needs to be a heightened bar of
review and opportunities for contestation whenever this
affects the public sphere (in the widest sense of the term),
even when there are no individuals whose individual lib-
erty rights are violated. Third, the government use of
surveillance technologies in the public sphere must always
remain appropriately restricted so that surveillance-free
spaces of public deliberation remain available that would
allow for both small-scale (e.g. for activist groups) and
large-scale group deliberation.
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